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I Notation
Ai States of nodel
Bj States of node I
Dh States of node D
Ci Consequences of events .E7 (utilitl, cost, damage,
injuries)
C,o, Total expected cost
Ei Events
Hi Hazard situation i
Hr Hazard situation under normal conditions
H2 Hazard situation due to fire
H3 Hazard situation due to fire without flashover
H4 Hazard situation due to fire with flashover
P(FlHi) Probability of failure F given situation.F{
g(r) Performance (limit state) function
Fr Probabiliry of failure F
Pa Target probability of failure
Pr Probability P(FlI12) ofstructural failure during fire
Prr," Probability of fire start P(I12)
r Generic point of the vector of basic variables
X Vector ofbasic variables
F Reliability index
qlr) Probability density function of the vector of basic
variables X
O-rritpi"l Inverse distribution function of standardized
normal variable
2 Introduction
Present standards for design of civil structures [], 2, 3] are
mostly based on the concept ofthe target probability of failure
10. Howeve4 it is well recognised that the reliability of srmc-
tures and other engineering systems suffers from a number of
uncertainties, thar can hardly be analysed 14, b,6l and well
described [7] by probabilistic methods. Moreove4, traditional
probabilistic concepts consider the significance of failure and
other adverse evenrs only very vaguely [], 2]. That is why
probabilistic methods are often supplemented by recently
l0
developing methods of risk assessment [5, 6, 8, g]. In some
countries, risk assessment even becomes compulsory by law in
the case of complex technical systems (powei stations, tunnel
routes) by law.
With regard to probabilistic concepts, it should be noted
that civil engineering structures and other engineering sys-
tems suffer fiom a number of uncertainties, which can hardly
be entirely described by available theoretical tools. These
uncertainties include [8]:
r natural randomness of basic variables,
o statistical uncertainties caused by a limited amount of avail-
able data.
o model uncertainties caused by deficiencies of computa-
tional models,
r uncertainties caused by inaccuracy in definitions of limit
states,
. gross errors caused by human faults,
o lack of understanding of the actual behaviour of materials
and structures.
The above uncertainties are listed in an order correspond-
ing to their increasing effect on the ffequency of failures
and the decreasing possibility of describing them theoretical-
ly. taditional probability methods usually deal with the first
three types of uncertainties only. The fourth uncertainty
could be partly described using the theory offuzzy sets [10].
Theoretical tools for the description ofgross errors are insut
ficient [5], while no tools are available to describe lack of
understanding of the actual behaviour of new materials and
stnrctures. The theoretical tools obviously have a limited ca-
pability to describe all rypes of uncerrainries [7,8]. This fact
may partly explain the observed proportions of failure causes
indicated in [8].
In general, structural failures and other adverse events
occus primarily under hazard (accidental) situations (due to
impact, explosion, fire and extreme climatic actions) and
partially under normal (persistent) design situations due to
common load effects. Obviously, further developments in
advanced engineering design should be focussed on the most
important causes, including the e{Iects ofvarious hazard situ-
ations due to human activity and extreme environmental
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effects. Probabilistic concepts constitute the most important
theoretical tool.
3 Probabilistic design methods
Probabilistic methods are commonly based on the as-
sumption that an event (failure) F given a certain condition
(hazard situation) H, is unequivocally described by inequality
g(r) < 0, where g(r) = 0 is the so called limit state function and
x is a realisation of the vector of basic variables X' If the
joint probability density qx(xlH) of basic variables X given
the situation H is known, then the conditional probability
pF =P(F!H) can be determined,as
pF =P(F!H) = lq*<*lula* . (l)
91J;.o
Instead of the probability po rhe reliability index
F =-oil(Pr) is often used. It is well recognised [4] that the
described concept has several deficiencies. Important defi-
ciencies originate from uncertainties in the defrnition of the
limit state function g(r) and in probabilistic models of basic
variables X given the conditions 11. Howevet the most signifi-
cant and essential deficiency of probabilistic design methods
based solely on equation (l) is the lack of consideration for
all hazard situations H, and the relevant consequences of
unfavourable events. To reduce this drawback, methods of
risk analysis and assessment have recently been developed [5,
6l and applied (e.g., [6]).
4 Basic concepts of risk assessment
The risk assessment of a system attempts to cover all
possible hazard situations that might lead to unfavourable
events related to the considered system. The hazard situations
include gross errors in human activity and accidental actions
such as impact, explosion, fire and extreme climatic
loads. Identified hazard situations (including accidental and
common design situations), designated generally as H,, are
assumed to occurwith a certain probability P(H,). If the failure
F of a structure due to a particular situation Hr occurs with the
conditional probability P(FlHr), then the total probability of
falhne p, is given as I l]:
po = FpirlHi)P(Hi). e)/-/
x
The conditional probabilities P(FIH;) must usually be
found by a separate analysis of the respective situations H,'
Equation (2) can be used for harmonisation of the partial
probabilities of failure P(flH,) P(H;) corresponding to the
situations H,, and for the follorving risk consideration.
In general, the hazard situations H,may lead to a number
of events E, (e.g., collapse, excessive deformations, full devel-
opment of-the fire, impact). The consequences of the events
Eu are expressed by one-dimensional utility comp_onents C,'
(.i.g., by the costs expressed in a certain currency)' Ifthe con-
sequences C,, are uniquely related to the events E, then the to-
tal utility (ridk) C related to the hazard situations H' is given as
[8],
c=fcre1n,,lrtop1no7. (3)
,1-/
ii
It is sometimes necessary to describe the consequences of
an unfavourable event E,, by a quantity having several compo-
nents, denoted as Ci;, l (describing for example costs, injuries
or casualties). The components Cu of the resultant risk are
then given as \_rcn=) cij,kP(EijlHi)P(Hr). e)
'' /-,t
U
If it is possible to specify the acceptable limit Cu,, for the
components Co, then the structure can be designed on the ba-
sis of the condition for acceptable risks Cp < Cp,;, which sup-
plements the probability condition Pr < Fa.
Several methods have been developed to analyse risk
(fault tree, event tree, causal networks). A promising method
seems to be provided by Bayesian decision analysis using
decision trees or Bayesian (believe) causal networks.
5 Decision tree
In general a decision tree has three basic nodes, as indi-
cated in Fig. l: a decision node representing alternative ac-
tions or options, a chance node representing the random out-
come of the decision, and a utility node representing utility or
risk outcornes of the decision [9].
llandorrr outtotne
t.lritit].-
Altematives I
Fig. l: Decision tree for prior and posterior analysis
The simplest form of decision analysis is so-called prior-
-analysis of the risk (utility) when the basic statistical and
probabilistic information is available prior to any decision or
lctivitv. Prior analysis is an assessment of the risk associated
with different decisions; it is commonly used for compar-
ing the risks corresponding to different decisions. Posterior
decision analysis differs from prior analysis by considering
possible changes in the branching probabilities and/or the
iottr.qu..t.et due to risk reducing measures' risk mitigating
lLrndom tlutc{}luo
System
performance
Litilit]
llecision
Risk reducine and
Results of mitigation miasures
mveslgauon
Planned
investigation
Fig. 2: Decision tree for pre-posterior decision analysis
ll
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measures and collection of additional information. Fosterior
decision analysis may be used to evaluate different aclditional
activities affecting the total risk.
a1ottrc1 important modification of the described ap_
P,P".h.t,, Foy" T pr€-posterior decision analysis, -"y b.illustrated by the decision tree shown in Iig. 2. The aim ofpre-posterior decision analysis is to identifi the optimal deci-
sions with regard to activities that may be performed in the
!qr., e.9., planning of risk reducing activities and/or col-lection of nen' information. An imporunt pre_requisite for
pre-posterior decision analysis is consideration ofhrture ac-
tions that may be applied taking into accounr the results of
the planned activities.
6 Bayesian network
Bayesian networks or influence diagrams (Bayesian net_
works supplemented by utility nodes)ltZ, ta1 provide an
important generalization ofvarious decision trees. The main
features of this method are illustrated by the following nvo
examples. trig. 3 shows a simplified network extracted from
influence_diagrams developed for risk analysis of buildings
under a fire design situation [14, lb, 16]. Tfre nenuork coi_
sists ofseven chance nodes numbered l, 2, g,4,5, 12 and 14,
four decision nodes 6, 7, 15 and 16, and six utility nodes g, 9,
10, ll, 13 and 17. The utility nodes represent the costs of
yT."jr fire safety measures (nodes S, l0; lZ), damage to the
building (nodes 9, I l), and injuries (node l3).
Nodes are interconnected by directional arrows indicating
causal links between par€nt and children nodes. AII the causa]
links must, horvevel be described by appropriare input dara(conditional probabilities or utility unit$ tinrca to assumed
states of the nodes. For example the utility nodes (except
utility node l3) are directly dependent on the size of a build-
ing (node l5). Utility node 13, describing the cost of injury
is affected b7 the size of the building through the number of
endangercd persons represenred Uy ctranie node 14. This
data is sometimes difficult to specify, and expertjudgement
often has to be used.
Chance nodes l, 2,2,4,5,12 and 14 represent alternative
random variables having two or more states. The node I _Sit_
uation describes the probability of fire start pfi,s 
= 
p(II2) and
the complementary probabitii t 
-p6.uof iro^iinaf situation
1{,..Chance node 2-Sprinklers descriEes the functioning of
sprinklers provided that the decision (node 6) is positiveithe
probability of the active state of the sprinklers gin.r, uj n..
start is assumed to be very high, for eiample 0.gg9. Chance
node 3-Flashover has two states: the design situation ilu (fire
design situation without flashover) and H. 1fire design siiua-
tion wirh flashover when the fire is fully developed).
If sprinklers are installed the flashover in a compart-
ment of 250 m2 has the positive state with the conditionalprobability 0.002; if sprinklers are nor installed then
P{H4lH2} =0.066 [14, 15, l6]. It is assumed that with proba_
bilities equal to squanes of the above values the fire wiil flash
over the whole building thus the values 0.000004 and 0.0044
are considered for chance node 3. Chance node 4_protection(introduced for formal computational reasons) has identical
states as decision node 7-protection. Chance node 5_Col_
lapse represents structural failure that is described bv the
probability distribution linked to three children nodes il, 3,4). This situation can hardly be modelled using a decision
tree. Nore that the probability of collapse in the case of fire
brrt not flashover may be smaller than in a persistent situa-
tion, due to the lower imposed load.
In order to describe the basic principle of probability cal-
culation used when analysing Bayesian networks, consider
the fundamental task indicated in Fig. 4. The simple ocample
in Fig. 4 is taken out of the diagram shown in fig. b. One child
node D (Node I 
- 
Iire flashover) is dependent on rwo parenr
Fig' 3: Bayesian nenryork describing a structure under normal and fire design situations
t2
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Fig. 4: A fundamental case of a Bayesian network
nodes: I (Node I Design situation) and I (Node 2 Sprin-
klers), each of them having a number of discrete statesli and
8,.
If the children nodes I and I have a discrete statel, and
B, then the probability of event Q (a particular state of node
D) is given by the formula
srp(Dk)= ) ,v1ople,n,)P(Ai)P(B j). (4)L,l
In addition to the general relationships (2) and (3), equa-
tion (4) represent the fundamental theoretical tool for analyz-
ing Bayesian network or influence diagrams. The input data
consists of the conditional probabilitiesP(Dpl'\87), which are
sometimes diffrcult to specif.
Another example of an influence diagram recently used
for risk analysis of tunnel routes in Prague is indicated in
Frg. 5 (unpublished study of the author). It shows the most
important nodes describing safety in tunnels. It contains six
decision nodes representing imPortant factors (l to 6), seven
chance nodes (7 to l3) and six utility nodes (14 to l9). Arrows
indicating causal links connect relevant nodes. All the causal
links must again be characterized by appropriate input data'
It is interesting to note that in this case the nenvork
includes six decision nodes describing important factors af-
fecting the safety of a tunnel, which might be adjusted at the
design stage. The utility node$ repr€sent the economic factors
and adverse consequences (nodes 14 to l9)'
A more detailed description of the nodes is provided by
the following list, which also indicates difticulties in input data
specification.
Decision nodes (l to 6)
1. Structure. The decision node describes the structural
arrangement of the tumrel (length, slope, number of
lanes, etc.), which might be adjusted at the design stage.
2. Traffic. Describes the raffrc arangements in the tunnel
(curves, ingoing and outgoing lanes) that are alternatively
considered in the design.
3. E-routes. Describes the distance of the escape routes and
their capaciry that are considered in the design.
4. F-safety. Describes extent of fire safety measures applied
in the tunnel, which may be adjusted in the design'
5. Ventilation. Describes the probability that the ventilation
system applied in the tunnel will actually be functioning.
6. T-equipm. Describes the extent of the technological
equipment that is activated in case of an accident.
Chance nodes (7 to 13)
?. N*accid. This chance node describes the ntrmber of acci-
dents per year.
8. N-pers. f)escribes the number of persons endangered
during traffrc accidents in the tunnel.
9. F-starts. Describes the probability that a fire will start.
l0.Function" Describes the efficiency of the fire safety
equipment.
11. Fire. Describes the probability of a fully developed fire.
l2.Function. Describes the efiiciency of the ventilation
system.
Fig. 5: Bayesian network for risk analysis in tunnels
l3
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I 3 . Smoke. Describes the intensity of smoke developed in the
tunnel.
Utility nodes (f4 to f9)
14.C3. Cost of the decision described in node 3.
15.C4. Cost of the decision described in node 4.
16. C5. Cost of the decision described in node 5.
17. C6. Cost of the decision described in node 6.
18. Injuries. Cost due to injuries.
19. Cll. Cost of a frrlly developed fire.
hobabilistic and risk analysis is very similar ro that de_
scribed in detail above for the case of a fire situation. Wthout
going into technical details trig. 5 shows the effect of the
vCntilation system and technological equipment on the ex_
pected risk ofone tunnel in the city routi circle in prague,
taking into accounr fatal injuries only.
R
t.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
2
Technological equipment only
Fig. 6: Effect of ventilation level and technological equipment on
expected risk in a tunnel
7 Tle implied cost of averting
a fatality
The utiliry nodes may generally describe economic as
well as social and environmenhl costs [lZ, lg, lg]. In order
compare all possible damages it is necessary to express all
consequences in terms of a single unit. This seems io be an
extremely difficult task. Thble I indicates that the cost of one
life is estimated to about I to 3 million of USD (data pre_
sented in [9]). The so-called Implied Cost of Averting; Fa_
tality ICAF can be expressed as( 
.'-r)
rcAF(L,e)=gl r-[t*{l' lor, (5)[.' e) )
where symbols g, e andw are defined in Table l. However, the
data indicated in Table I remains a subject for further investi-
gation and should be considered as indicative values only.
8 Criteria for social risks
An important question concerning risk assessment is what
happens when we compare obtained results with acceptable
limits. The criteria for social limits shown in Fig. Z are-taken
from [8].
I l0 nr 100 1000
0.1
P
0.01
0.001
0.0001
0.00001
\
*N *=l
' 1 1=0.1, t=2
.lYesterschelde
Fig. 7: Acceptable level ofsocial risks
Table l: The Implied Cost of Averting a Fatality 
- 
ICAF(&), financial data in ppp USg (1999) obtained from UN-HDR 2001, WorldBank
Country g - annual income a - life time 2 zr.r - working part of e ICAF(Ae) tx lOt
US 34000 ,7,7 0.15 2.6
J"pa. 26000 8t 0.15 2.1
Germany 25000 0.125 1.9
UK 22000 tt 0.125 t.7
Czech Republic 8000 ID 0.15 0.6
Mexico 8800 72 0.15 0.6
South Africa 9100 CD 0.15 0.5
Colombia 5900 70 0.15 0.4
China 3900 70 0. l5 0.3
India 2400 63 0. l5 0.1
Nigeria 800 47 0.18 0.04
t4
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International standard ISO 2394 (1998) provides a limit
for an individual risk of fatal injury per year by the value 10'6.
If there are more endangered persons in one accident, the
acceptable risk is usually expressed [8] as
P(R>N) <A N-h,
where .R is the assessed risk (number of fatal injuries), N de-
notes the acceptable number of fatal injuries, and A and k
are suitable parameters. Fig. 5 shows three variants of these
criteria:
. upper bound for l = 0. 1 and A = I,
o middle level for I = 0.1 and A = 2,
o lower bound forl = 0.01 and & = 2.
The upper bound indicates the uttermost (most benevo-
lent) acceptable limit, while the lower (morc severe) bound
shows generally acceptable limits. The region benveen the
lower and upper limits is often denoted by the known ab-
breviation ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Possible). If the
assessed values are within the ALARP region, it is recom-
mended to decrease the assessed risk as much as possibie. It
is interesting to note that the middle level of the limit for
A =0.1 andh = 2 (indicated in Fig. 7 by the dashed and dotted
line) has been accepted as an accepted risk level fbr the road
tunnel in Westerschelde in the Netherlands [8].
It should be emphasized that the above-described criteria
include casualties (social consequences) only and do not con-
sider any other (economic or political) consequences. Combi-
nation of different type of adverse consequences remain an
oPen question.
I Concluding remarks
Tiaditional approaches to engineering design of civil
engineering structures and other technical systems are fre-
quently based on the concept of target probability' This
fundamental quantity is usually based on comParative studies
and past experience only. Moreover, probabilistic design
methods suffer from several deficiencies, including lack of
consideration for accidental and other hazard situations.
Howeve4 more and more frequently both these extreme
conditions are becoming the causes of serious failures and
other adverse events. For this reason, the specification ofthe
target probability of failure remains an open question (horv
safe is safe enough?).
'fhe most important contribution of risk analysis and
assessment consists in systematic consideration of various
consequences. Several techniques are available at pl'esent:
decision trees, the Bayesian belief networks and influence dia-
grams. Available experience indicates that the Bayesian belief
networks provide a transparent, logical and effective tool for
analysing engineering systems. It should however be under-
lined that any analysis of an engineering system is always
dependent on assumed input data, often of a very uncertain
nature. The input data should be estimated with due regard
to the specific technological and economic conditions of a
given system. In particular, the economic , social and environ-
mental consequences of adverse events should be further
investigated.
It appears that methods of risk analysis and assessment
may significantly contribute to further improvement of cur-
rent engineering design. The remarkable fact that the public
is better prepared to accept certain risks than to stand for
specified probabilities of failurt will make the application of
risk assessment easier. It is therefore anticipated that in the
near future probabilistic methods in engineering will be sup-
plemented by criteria for acceptable risks.
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